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FORDHAM ENVIRONMENT AL LAW REVIEW 
SIXTEENTH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM 
GLOBAL RESPONSES TO ECO-MIGRATION AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL DIASTERS: THE ROLE OF U.S. AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 
THE ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE: IS 
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION PART OF THE PROBLEM 
OR PART OF THE SOLUTION? 
Howard F. Chang* 
Environmental degradation caused by climate change or other 
factors will cause migration of those displaced or harmed. Droughts, 
desertification, flooding, and other natural disasters have caused such 
migration in the past and are likely to increase in the future as a result 
of climate change. 1 Indeed, climate change may become the largest 
environmental cause of displacement in the future. 2 
* Earle Hepburn Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
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1. See Oli Brown, Int'l Org. for Migration, Migration and Climate Change 16 
(2008) (predicting that "climate change will cause population movements by 
making certain parts of the world much less viable places to live; by causing food 
and water supplies to become more unreliable and increasing the frequency and 
severity of floods and storms"). As Brown observes: "[m]igration is (and always 
has been) an important mechanism to deal with climate stress." Id. at 21. 
2. See Suzette Brooks Masters, Environmentally Induced Migration: Beyond a 
Culture of Reaction, 14 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 855, 863-64 (2000) (warning that 
"climate change represents a likely future cause of tremendous environmental 
141 
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In this essay, I address how immigration policies should respond to 
international migration induced by environmental degradation, 
especially degradation resulting from climate change. In Part I, I 
consider the suggestion that we create a new category of refugee 
entitled to special rights under national immigration laws. I suggest 
that such a category is unlikely to help most of those harmed by 
environmental degradation unless it is so broad as to liberalize 
economic migration substantially. In Part II, I consider the 
economics of international migration, which indicates that 
liberalization of that migration is likely both to increase global wealth 
and to improve its distribution. In Part III, I offer a critique of the 
claims advanced by advocates of immigration restriction as a policy 
to protect the environment. I argue that we should instead tum to 
more equitable and more efficient responses to climate change and 
other environmental problems. In Part IV, I conclude that liberalized 
immigration laws would instead be part of the optimal response to 
environmental problems. 
1. ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRANTS 
Although some have suggested treating environmental migrants as 
refugees,3 the legal definition of a refugee under the immigration 
laws of the United States and under international law includes only 
those fleeing persecution in their home countries, not those fleeing 
environmental or economic harm at home.4 This definition makes 
damage and displacement, capable of dwarfing all the other factors"); id. at 865 
(noting that "some experts forecast that climate change may become the largest 
source of displacement in the future"). 
3. See, e.g., Norman Myers & Jennifer Kent, Environmental Exodus: An 
Emergent Crisis in the Global Arena 154 ( 1995) (urging us "to expand our entire 
approach to refugees in general in order to encompass environmental refugees" and 
to grant "official standing" to "environmental refugees"); see also Brown, supra 
note I, at 13-14, 36-37 (discussing efforts to expand the definition of "refugee" to 
include environmental migrants); Masters, supra note 2, at 866-70 (same). 
4. Under u.s. law, a "refugee" must be "unable or unwilling to return" to the 
refugee's home country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.c. § 1 101(a)(42)(A) (2000). Similarly, 
international law requires a "refugee" to have a "well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
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some sense once we recognize that the primary function of these 
rules is to grant a particularly needy class of international migrants 
special rights under national immigration laws.5 These special rights 
derive their justification from the dire consequences of returning 
international migrants to a country in which they face persecution. 
Most people directly displaced by environmental degradation can 
avoid the most dire consequences of that degradation within the 
borders of their home country. 6 In contrast, at least when the 
refugee's own government is either the perpetrator or sponsor of 
persecution, this persecution raises a presumption against an internal 
flight alternative. 7 If we seek a definition suitable for immigration 
law purposes, then we would attempt to define a class of 
environmental migrants who similarly lack an internal flight 
social group or political opinion." Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. 
5. I am using the term "immigration laws" broadly to include not only laws 
regarding admission of immigrants for permanent residence but also laws regarding 
more limited rights for aliens seeking entry. These rights may include, for 
example, nonrefoulement, which protects a refugee against return to a country of 
persecution. See Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff et al., Immigration and Citizenship: 
Process and Policy 845 (6th ed. 2008). 
6. There may be some whose only reasonable option will be international 
migration. In the face of climate change, for example, "migration may be the only 
possible adaptive response in the case of some of the Small Island and low-lying 
states where rising seas will eventually flood large parts of the country." Brown, 
supra note 1, at 38. "The scope for internal population redistribution within such 
countries is limited, so there will be pressure for resettlement in another country." 
Graeme Hugo, Environmental Concerns and International Migration, 30 Int'l 
Migration Rev. 105, 119 (1996). These cases, however, will be the exception 
rather than the rule: "[m]ost people displaced by environmental causes will find 
new homes within the boundaries of their own countries." Brown, supra note 1, at 
23; see Hugo, supra, at 119 (predicting that "it is within countries that the bulk of 
population displacement is likely to occur"); see also Masters, supra note 2, at 868 
("[T]he vast majority of environmental migrants are internally displaced persons 
who are excluded from the definition of refugee primarily because they have not 
crossed international borders, rather than because the environmental factors 
inducing their migration do not amount to persecution or concerted state action."). 
7. See 8 C.F.R. §§  208. 13(b)(3)(ii), 1208.13(b)(3)(ii) (2004); Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy 1052 (4th ed. 2005) (noting 
that "if there is an internal flight alternative," then the alien's "fear of persecution" 
is "not well-founded," but "if the government is either the perpetrator or the 
sponsor of the persecution ... there is a rebuttable presumption" against such an 
alternative ). 
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alternative. The result, however, would probably be a rather narrow 
definition that will be of little use for most migrants harmed by 
environmental degradation. 
At the same time, we may believe that principles of justice imply 
that a broader class of international migrants has a special claim to 
immigration based on the environmental cause of the harm that they 
are seeking to escape. If the wealthy countries of the world, for 
example, are responsible for most emissions of greenhouse gases, 
then we might believe that those countries have a special obligation 
to mitigate the harm that climate change inflicts on the poor in 
developing countries, who have emitted the least per capita. 8 This 
moral obligation might include a duty to admit migrants fleeing the 
adverse effects of anthropogenic climate change on their quality of 
life, 9 even if these adverse effects may not rise to the same level of 
harm faced by those fleeing persecution. This rationale makes it 
important to identify the effects of anthropogenic climate change in 
particular, because the precise cause of migration is important to the 
international migrant's moral claim. 
If we define this broader class of environmental migrants to 
include anyone harmed by anthropogenic climate change, however, 
then we may find it difficult to identify members of this class. First, 
scientific uncertainty may undermine our ability to attribute any 
particular environmental harm to anthropogenic climate change. For 
example, if a farmer worker can no longer make a living because the 
land he farms has deteriorated as a result of drought and 
desertification, then how do we determine whether this desertification 
would have occurred even in the absence of greenhouse gas 
emissions or is instead the result of anthropogenic climate change? 
Tracing the cause of any particular harm may be difficult when 
anthropogenic climate change only increases the risk of such specific 
events. 
8. See Brown, supra note 1, at 39 ("Some analysts are beginning to argue that 
immigration is both a necessary element of global redistributive justice and an 
important response to climate change; that greenhouse gas emitters should take an 
allocation of climate migrants in proportion to their historical emissions."). 
9. See Masters, supra note 2, at 879 (arguing that "richer nations" should 
"welcome migrants from less developed countries, " because "all nations are 
partners in a global social contract with global responsibilities," including a duty 
"to share in the global environmental burdens that affects nations unequally"). 
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Second, even if we assume that the observed desertification has 
been caused by anthropogenic climate change rather than other 
factors, the question remains whether the farm worker would have 
migrated even in the absence of that desertification. After all, the 
process of economic development normally leads workers to migrate 
from rural farms to urban labor markets as employment opportunities 
expand in local cities. Thus, even in the absence of desertification, 
any given migrating farm worker may have left home to seek better 
economic opportunities elsewhere. 10 
Finally, the problem becomes even more difficult once we 
recognize that those who migrate across national borders may flee the 
indirect effects of climate change. For example, farm workers 
displaced from agriculture may migrate to seek work in local cities 
within their home country, driving down wages in those urban labor 
markets. The drop in wages may induce other workers with better 
access to social networks abroad to emigrate in search of higher 
wages in wealthy countries of immigration. II These international 
migrants, like the farm workers, seek to escape economic harm 
caused by climate change. 
Similar economic halm arises when a poor country must divert 
scarce public resources to adapt to climate change, for example, to 
build sea walls to adapt to higher sea levels. 12 If this adaptation 
leaves less in the public treasury to invest in other infrastructure or in 
public education, then the result may be a less developed economy 
and greater incentives for migrants to leave their home countries in 
search of better 0ppoliunities elsewhere. These international 
10. See Brown, supra note 1, at 25 (noting that "disaggregating what role 
climate change might play in added rural-urban migration is speculative"); id. at 12 
(observing that "disaggregating the role of climate change from other 
environmental, economic and social factors" in "individual migrants' decisions to 
leave their homes" behind "requires an ambitious analytical step into the dark"); 
Steve Lonergan, The Role of Environmental Degradation in Population 
Displacement, Envtl. Change & Sec. Project Rep., Spring 1998, at 5, 12 (noting 
that "population movement" occurs "in response to a combination of 
environmental, economic, social and political .. . stimuli"). 
II. See Brown, supra note , 1 at 23 ("Migration ... typically requires access to 
money, family networks and contacts in the destination country."). 
12. See id. at 38 (predicting that "individual countries will have to make a series 
of cost-benefit decisions on what they want to protect," for example, by "building 
sea walls"). 
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migrants also seek to escape economic harm caused by climate 
change. 
If most harm from climate change takes economic forms, however, 
then environmental migrants will be difficult to distinguish from 
economic migrants who flow along the same paths to seek the same 
opportunities in the same destination countries. After all, the 
environmental migrant has no more reason than the economic 
migrant to favor employment opportunities in countries of 
immigration over those available in the country of emigration. A 
country of immigration will not find it easy to tell precisely which 
migrants would not have migrated but for the widespread effects of 
anthropogenic climate change. 
For all these reasons, the prospects seem dim for a workable yet 
usefully broad legal definition of environmental migrants for 
immigration law purposes that successfully distinguishes such 
migrants from economic migrants. Our alternatives are probably to 
adopt either a narrow definition that excludes many who are harmed 
by anthropogenic climate change or a broad definition that in practice 
allows many economic migrants to benefit as well. 13 In this sense, an 
immigration policy designed to help a large number of environmental 
migrants would also require us to tolerate greater flows of economic 
migrants. 
II. THE ECONOMICS OF MIGRATION 
Unfortunately, current immigration policies in the United States 
and other wealthy countries are hostile to economic migrants from 
developing countries,14 which would supply most environmental 
13. See Masters, supra note 2, at 868 (predicting that "consensus on which 
categories of migrants are suitable for inclusion within an expanded definition of 
refugee would be very difficult to achieve, and only a limited expansion would be 
possible given the enormous number of migrants potentially eligible to become 
refugees overnight if the definition were ever changed"). 
14. See Myers & Kent, supra note 3, at 9 (noting that "migrant aliens prove 
unwelcome" and that "developed countries . .. are taking steps to further restrict 
immigration flows from developing countries"); see also Masters, supra note 2, at 
873 (noting that "a major impediment" to "possible policy responses to 
environmental displacement" arises because "host countries are increasingly 
reluctant to accept immigrants"). 
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migrants. 15 Less developed countries will tend to be less able to 
adapt and more vulnerable to environmental degradation than 
wealthy countries. Yet restrictive immigration policies prevent the 
poor from fleeing the harm inflicted by climate change in developing 
countries. 
These restrictive policies remain popular despite the economic 
gains that the world enjoys when workers migrate from low-wage 
countries to high-wage countries. 16 Higher wages in the destination 
country imply that the marginal product of labor is higher there than 
in the source country. That is, higher wages for the same worker 
mean that the worker produces more value in the destination country 
than in the source country. Labor migration generally leads to net 
gains in global wealth because labor flows to the country where it has 
the highest-value use. 17 For this reason, basic economic theory raises 
a presumption in favor of the free movement of labor. Immigration 
restrictions distort the global labor market, producing a misallocation 
of labor among countries, thereby wasting human resources and 
creating unnecessary poverty in labor-abundant countries. 
In fact, the W orId Bank has recently studied the potential gains 
from a modest increase in migration from "developing" countries to 
"high-income countries" and concluded that such an increase "would 
generate large increases in global welfare." I 8 The gains would be 
distributed such that if we examine the effects on natives in countries 
of immigration, on the migrants, and on those left behind in countries 
of emigration, we find that each group would enjoy significant gains. 
The migrants would gain by obtaining higher wages in destination 
countries, natives in destination countries would obtain goods and 
15. See Brown, supra note 1, at 31 (noting that "the developing countries - the 
least responsible for emissions of greenhouse gases - will be the most affected by 
climate change"). 
16. The discussion that follows draws from a more extended discussion in 
Howard F. Chang, The Economic Impact of International Labor Migration: Recent 
Estimates and Policy Implications, 16 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 321, 322-26 
(2007). 
17. See Paul R. Krugman & Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics: 
Theory and Policy 158-59 (2d ed. 1991). 
18. World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of 
Remittances and Migration 25-26 (2006). The World Bank concludes that an 
increase in migration sufficient to increase the labor force in the host countries by 
3% by the year 2025 would increase the world's real income by $356 billion in 
2025. See id. at 31. 
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services from immigrant labor at lower cost, and those left behind in 
source countries would enjoy a net gain from remittances sent home 
by migrants working in destination countries. 19 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL RESTRICTIONISM 
Regrettably, restrictive immigration policies enjoy political support 
from some in the environmental movement in the United States.20 In 
2004, for example, the leadership of the Sierra Club had a heated 
debate over whether to advocate immigration restrictions, with 
Richard Lamm, the former Democratic governor of Colorado, 
arguing in favor of a restrictionist agenda.21 Although the Sierra 
Club decided to remain neutral on the issue,22 as have most 
environmental groups,23 some environmentalists have defended 
restrictive immigration policies.24 Garret Hardin, for example, 
argues for restrictionist immigration policies because migration of 
poor people into rich countries means "speeding up the destruction of 
the environment in rich countries.
,,2 5 In a similar vein, Roy Beck 
cites water pollution in lakes and rivers, urban air pollution, and 
19. See id. at 34. 
20. Restrictionist policies derive similar support in Australia, where Graeme 
Hugo reports that "the argument that immigrants exacerbate environmental 
pressures is gathering strength in the ongoing national debate about immigration 
levels." Hugo, supra note 6, at 122. 
21. See Felicity Barringer, Bitter Division for Sierra Club on Immigration, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 16, 2004, at AI. The Sierra Club also debated this issue several years 
earlier. See John H. Cushman, An Uncomfortable Debate Fuels a Sierra Club 
Election, N. Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1998, § 1, at 14. 
22. See Felicity Barringer, Establishment Candidates Defeat Challengers in 
Sierra Club Voting, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 2004, at A18. 
23. See David Hunter et aI., International Environmental Law and Policy 100 
(3d ed. 2007). 
24. See Aleinikoff et a!., supra note 5, at 487 (noting that "[s]ome 
environmentalists have taken a lead role in efforts to restrict immigration," in order 
to reduce "air and water pollution, urban sprawl, climate change, and wasteful 
consumption"); Legomsky, supra note 7, at 75 (noting that some environmentalists 
"fear that high levels of immigration, by increasing the population size ... , will 
exacerbate congestion, sprawl, pollution, and consumption of scarce resources"). 
25. Garret Hardin, Living on a Lifeboat, 24 BioScience 561, 566 (1974). 
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"urban sprawl" as reasons for Congress "to set immigration . . .  as 
close to zero as possible.,,26 
Immigration restrictions, however, are misguided from an 
environmental perspective. Although migrants may impose 
environmental costs in the host country, their emigration may 
produce greater environmental benefits in the source country, where 
population growth may increase pollution or deforestation. As the 
National Research Council has observed, "[f]rom a world 
perspective, (negative) environmental effects i n  the United States 
may be counterbalanced by possible (positive) effects in the sending 
countries that are losing population.,,27 In this sense, those who 
defend immigration restrictions as a way to avoid urban sprawl or 
local pollution at home exhibit an especially myopic brand of 
environmentalism, one focused on the domestic effects of 
immigration rather than on the total effect of migration on the global 
environment as a whole.28 This perverse myopia is ironic in a 
movement known for urging us to "think globally." 
A. International Migration and Population Growth 
There are restrictionists who argue against immigration in terms of 
effects on the global environment or on the environment in countries 
of emigration. Some restrictionists suggest that migration will 
undermine incentives for citizens of countries of emigration to 
protect their local environment or to curb population growth. John 
26. Roy Beck, The Case Against Immigration: The Moral, Economic, Social, 
and Environmental Reasons for Reducing U.S. Immigration Back to Traditional 
Levels 248-49 (1996); see id. at 228-36 (citing environmental impacts in the United 
States as a reason to cut off immigration); see also David Miller, Immigration: The 
Case for Limits, in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics 193, 202 (Andrew 1. 
Cohen & Christopher Heath Wellman eds. , 2005) (worrying about immigration's 
"impacts on the physical environment," such as "congestion" and reduced "access 
to open space"). 
27. National Research Council, The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, 
and Fiscal Effects of Immigration 99 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds. 
1997) [hereinafter NRC]. 
28. For a defense of a cosmopolitan normative framework, which adopts a 
global perspective on the morality of immigration restrictions, see Howard F. 
Chang, The Economics of International Labor Migration and the Case for Global 
Distributive Justice in Liberal Political Theory, 4 1  Cornell Int'I L. J. 1, 11-25 
(2008). 
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Rawls, for example, worries that people may be tempted to "make up 
for their irresponsibility in caring for their land and its natural 
resources ... by migrating into other people's territory.,,29 Similarly, 
Joseph Heath speculates that liberalized migration could undermine 
incentives for countries to adopt "population control measures" and 
policies "preventing long-term environmental degradation" at 
home.3o "W ould any country any longer try to limit its birth rate," 
Herman Daly asks, if its CItizens were free to "migrate 
abroad ... ?,
,31 In a similar vein, Virginia Abernethy asserts that the 
"[ 0 ]pportunity to immigrate to the United States as well as large-scale 
international aid are probable factors contributing to high fertility in 
Third W orId countries. 
,,32 Insofar as population growth generates 
greater pressure on natural resources in the global commons, any 
tendency for migration to undermine population control would also 
halm the global environment. 
We must weigh these conjectures, however, against the empirical 
evidence indicating that migration would instead reduce population 
growth. Migrants who move from developing countries with high 
fertility rates to developed countries with low fertility rates often 
reduce their own fertility to the lower rates prevailing in the country 
of immigration. 33 Immigration restrictions force prospective 
29. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 39 (1999). 
30. Joseph Heath, Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Social Contract, 10 
Can. J.L. & Jurisprudence 343, 348 (1997). 
3 1. Herman E. Daly, Population, Migration, and Globalization, 59 Ecological 
Econ. 187, 188 (2006). 
32. Virginia Abernethy, The Demographic Transition Revisited: Lessons for 
Foreign Aid and U.S. Immigration Policy, 8 Ecological Econ. 235, 247 (1993). 
Heath suggests that "if China could count on an ability to export its surplus 
population to less crowded parts of the world, the incentive to control it would be 
considerably diminished." Heath, supra note 30, at 348; see Miller, supra note 26, 
at 201 ("A viable popUlation policy .. . requires each state to be responsible for 
stabilizing .. . its population over time, and this is going to be impossible . .. if 
there are no restrictions on the movement of people between states."). But see Eric 
Neumayer, The Environment: One More Reason to Keep Immigrants Out?, 59 
Ecological Econ. 204, 206 (2006) ("[T]o my knowledge there is not much evidence 
that any country uses the 'safety valve' of migration . . . to avoid tackling domestic 
demographic problems."). 
33. See Joel E. Cohen, Human Population Grows Up, Sci. Arn., Sept. 2005, at 
48, S4 (suggesting that migration "may accelerate the slowing of population 
grO\vth, " because "[m]igrants who move from high-fertility to low-fertility regions 
or their descendants often adopt the reduced fertility patterns of their new home, 
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migrants to remain in developing countries, where they are likely to 
have more children than they would if they instead migrated to 
developed countries. 34 Based on this effect, the National Research 
Council predicts that "total world population will be slightly lower," 
not higher, with more immigration into the United States.3S 
Furthermore, immigration restnctIOns may lead developed 
countries to adopt fertility policies designed to increase population 
growth rates in their native populations. As Russia and the wealthier 
countries of Europe see their fertility rates falling and their 
populations shrinking and growing older, they find that they have 
fewer young workers to support the elderly in their retirement years. 
Precisely because these countries resist liberalized immigration from 
developing countries as a response to their demographic problem, 
some of these countries have adopted the use of financial incentives 
instead to encourage their women to have more children. 36 These 
fertility policies are perverse in a world of excessive population 
growth and scarce natural resources. 37 Liberalized immigration 
policies would reduce the demand for such enviromnentally harmful 
fertility policies, because migrants tend to be young workers, those 
who have the most years of work still ahead of them and thus the 
most to gain from access to labor markets in wealthy countries. 38 
with some time delay"); see also Francine D. Blau, The Fertility of Immigrant 
Women: Evidence from High-Fertility Source Countries, in Immigration and the 
Work Force 93, 127 (George J. Borjas & Richard B. Freeman eds. , 1992) 
(reporting "indirect evidence suggesting that immigrant women have fewer 
children in the United States than they would have had in the source country"). 
34. See Neumayer, supra note 32, at 206 ("[I]f forced to remain in their 
developing sending country, . . . would-be emigrants are likely to have more 
children than they will in their chosen country of destination."). 
35. NRC, supra note 27, at 99. 
36. See C.J. Chivers, Putin Urges Plan to Reverse Slide in the Birth Rate, N. Y. 
Times, May 1 1, 2006, at A6; see also Russel Shorto, No Babies?, N.Y. Times, June 
29,2008 (Magazine), at 34. Russia, for example, has adopted programs to increase 
the birth rate by paying subsidies to families that have more children. See Clifford 
J. Levy, Its Population Falling, Russia Beckons Its Children Home, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 2 1, 2009, at AI. 
37. See Hunter et a1., supra note 23, at 86-101 (discussing the challenges posed 
by population growth for the global environment). 
38. See NRC, supra note 27, at 353 (estimating the "average fiscal impact of 
immigrants" in the United States and concluding that it "is positive in part because 
they tend to arrive at young working ages . . . and in part because they will help to 
pay the public costs of the aging baby-boom generations"). 
352 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA W REVIEW [VOL. XX 
Finally, insofar as emigration allows incomes to rise in developing 
countries, global population growth is likely to fall. Emigration 
would reduce the abundance of labor in developing countries and 
thereby increase real wages in those countries of emigration. 39 
Moreover, remittance payments from migrants will also raise the 
standard of living in developing countries. 40 The resulting increase 
in wealth for developing countries seems likely to reduce birth rates 
in those countries toward the low levels prevailing in wealthier 
developed countries.41 
The observation that "higher-income countries are characterized by 
lower population growth rates" at the present time is consistent with 
the stages of population growth experienced by industrialized 
countries over time during their economic development. 42 Although 
population growth may rise during earlier stages of this process, the 
third and final stage, "the period of demographic transition, involves 
large declines in the birthrate which exceed the continued declines in 
the death rate," suggesting that "reductions in population growth 
might accompany rising standards of living.,,43 Indeed, since 1975, 
"strong evidence indicates that most nations have entered the third 
phase, with overall growth rates falling. ,,44 Given this empirical 
evidence, at this point, rising standards of living in developing 
countries seem more likely on balance to reduce global population 
growth than to increase it. Therefore, the net effect of liberalized 
39. See World Bank, supra note 18, at 57-58. 
40. See Brown, supra note 1, at 34 (noting that "outmigration can .. . enhance 
the economic situation left behind through remittances," which "exceed official 
development aid in some developing countries"); id. at 40 (observing that "shutting 
borders . . .  undermines remittance economies and denies developing countries the 
benefits of access to the intemational labour market"). 
41. See Neumayer, supra note 32, at 206 (noting that as "remittance payments 
are likely to spur economic development" and "more developed countries have 
lower fertility rates," emigration would be "likely" to "have a negative rather than 
positive effect on birth rates" in countries of emigration that receive remittances). 
42. Tom Tietenberg, Environmental Economics and Policy 103 (4th ed. 2004). 
43. Id. at 104-05. 
44. Jonathan M. Harris, Environmental and Natural Resource Economics: A 
Contemporary Approach 187 (2002); see Eban S. Goodstein, Economics and the 
Environment 425 (5th ed. 2008) ("After cresting in the late 1960s, population 
growth rates have fallen in many places including China and India, the middle 
income countries, and the developed countries: Globally the rate of population 
growth fell to 1.3% from 1995 to 2000."). 
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immigration laws, which seem likely to promote higher standards of 
living in developing countries, would probably be to reduce world 
population growth. 
B. Poverty as an Environmental Policy 
By increasing wealth for the world's poor, international migration 
would also increase the demand for environmental amenities and for 
more pollution control in developing countries. As incomes rise, the 
political pressure for more environmental protection in those 
countries will increase, as the population becomes more able to 
afford the costs of pollution abatement. 45 Based on this effect and 
other consequences of economic development, the "Environmental 
Kuznets Curve" or "EKC hypothesis" predicts that "as per capita 
incomes rise in real terms, environmental quality will first of all fall 
but then, once some 'turning point' has been reached, start to rise. 
,,46 
Indeed, at least for "local and regional pollutants," the available 
empirical evidence supports the EKC hypothesis.47 This evidence 
suggests that international migration may promote environmental 
protection in many respects by increasing incomes in developing 
countries. 48 
45. See Nick Hanley et al., Introduction to Environmental Economics 130 
(2001) ("There is an increasing demand for environmental quality as incomes go 
up. This leads to an increase in government protection of the environment, and 
increasing green consumerism."). 
46. Nick Hanley et al., Environmental Economics in Theory and Practice 426 
(2d ed. 2007); see id. ("Reasons given for pollution falling after the turning point, 
and environmental quality rising, include . . .  a rising demand for environmental 
quality resulting in tougher environmental standards. "). 
47. Hanley et al., supra note 45, at 131 (citing studies of deforestation, sulfur 
dioxide, "urban emissions of particulates, and hazardous waste sites"). The most 
widely cited study examined "urban air pollution and contamination in river 
basins" and found that "air and water quality appear to benefit from economic 
growth once some critical level of income has been reached," which "in almost 
every case" occurs "at an income of less than $8000 ( 1985 dollars)" per capita. 
Gene M. Grossman & Alan B. Krueger, Economic Growth and the Environment, 
110 Q.1. Econ. 353, 370 (1995); see, e.g., Harris, supra note 44, at 414 n. 1 (citing 
Grossman & Krueger, supra, as a study of "sulfur dioxide, smoke, and particulate 
matter in air" and "oxygen loss, fecal contamination, and heavy metal 
contamination in water" that found evidence of the EKe hypothesis). 
48. "In fact," considering all the environmental benefits of poverty reduction in 
"poor countries," Eban Goodstein concludes that "the only effective way to 
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Furthermore, even if international migration had no effect on 
environmental policies, the resulting shift in world population could 
still produce environmental benefits. As migrants move from poor 
countries to rich countries, their migration tends to move people into 
jurisdictions with more stringent environmental regulations. 49 Any 
comprehensive evaluation of the environmental impact of 
international migration must consider all of these environmental 
benefits. 
Finally, insofar as emigration generates higher incomes in 
developing countries, this effect would also help alleviate the 
economic harm inflicted by climate change on those who stay behind 
as well as on those who emigrate. Thus, liberalized immigration 
policies allow us to mitigate the consequences of climate change, not 
only for environmental migrants who cross international borders but 
also for those who remain in their countries of origin. In this sense, a 
focus on the international migrants alone understates the degree to 
which liberalized immigration laws would compensate the victims of 
climate change. 
Yet some in the environmental movement fear international 
migration precisely because migration will increase wealth for the 
poor. In particular, when immigrants enjoy an increase in their own 
incomes, some fear that these immigrants will cause greater 
environmental harm than if they remained poor in their countries of 
origin, because these migrants will adopt the consumption patterns 
prevailing in wealthy countries. 50 Residents of wealthy countries, 
including the United States, consume fossil fuels and other natural 
resources at much higher rates than residents of developing 
improve environmental conditions is to alleviate the tremendous poverty faced by 
many of the people in these nations." Goodstein, supra note 44, at 423. 
49. NRC, supra note 27, at 99 (noting that "efforts to abate environmental 
effects at any given level of consumption may . .. be higher in the United States" 
than in countries sending immigrants to the United States). 
50. See Paul R. Ehrlich & Anne H. Ehrlich, One with Nineveh: Politics, 
Consumption, and the Human Future 108 (2004) (worrying that migrants "on 
average, . .. better their condition, become more affluent, consume more, and thus 
add more to the overall environmental impact of human beings than if they had 
stayed home"); Hunter et ai., supra note 23, at 100 ("Given U.S. consumption 
patterns, the average immigrant to the United States from a developing country will 
cause significantly higher environmental impacts than if they stayed in their native 
lands. ") . 
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countries.51 The United States and other industrialized countries are 
major sources of emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gases.52 
These environmentalists essentially advocate immigration 
restrictions precisely because we expect such restrictions to keep 
poor people in the very poverty that they want to escape. This 
deliberate use of poverty as an environmental policy is an especially 
ugly brand of environmentalism. This embrace of poverty as a policy 
instrument ignores the availability of far better, more efficient, more 
equitable, and more humane environmental policies. 
IV. THE OPTIMAL RE SPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM S 
To the extent that immigrants increase environmental harm, either 
in the host country or globally, the optimal response would be 
environmental policies tailored to specific environmental problems. 53 
For example, if we fear increased emissions of greenhouse gases, we 
should impose a tax on such emissions without discriminating against 
immigrants. Pollution taxes, such as a carbon tax on fossil fuels, can 
internalize negative externalities and deter immigrant and native alike 
from the specific activities causing environmental halm. 'vVe could 
use the revenues from such taxes to reduce income or payroll taxes, 
which would benefit native workers. 54 Immigration restrictions are 
relatively wasteful and clumsy instruments for environmental 
5l. See Aleinikoff et aI., supra note 5, at 487 (noting that some 
environmentalists cite the fact that "persons in the United States . . . consume 
energy and resources at a much higher level than persons in other countries" as a 
reason to restrict immigration into the United States). 
52. Mary M. Kritz, Time for a National Discussion on Immigration, 36 In1'l 
Migration Rev. 33, 34 (2002) (noting that "[d]ue mainly to immigration, U.S. 
population growth has climbed" and asking "about the implications of these 
population trends in an industrialized society that is highly dependent on fossil 
fuels and a major producer of greenhouse gas emissions"). 
53. See Hugo, supra note 6, at 123 (suggesting that a country of immigration 
"will be better off in general using resource management policies targeted to deal 
with specific resource and environmental concems, rather than using immigration 
policies"). 
54. Representative John Larson has introduced a bill in the U.S. Congress to 
impose such a carbon tax and to retum the revenue to workers through lower 
payroll taxes. See John M. Broder, House Bill for a Carbon Tax to Cut Emissions 
Faces a Steep Climb, N. Y. Times, Mar. 6, 2009, at A l3. 
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protection, because they needlessly sacrifice the benefits of 
migration, including the gains from international trade in the labor 
market. The collateral damage caused by immigration restrictions 
includes the poverty inflicted on those excluded by our restrictive 
policies. 
Indeed, to some extent, migration would be part of the optimal 
response to environmental problems such as climate change. Given 
the costs of preventing climate change and the costs of other forms of 
adaptation, emigration would be part of the optimal mix of responses 
to climate change. ss We should recognize that international 
migration is an important form of adaptation, not a symptom of a 
failure to adapt. 56 International migration mitigates the harm caused 
by climate change to its victims. Immigration restrictions make 
climate change more costly than necessary by blocking this obvious 
avenue of adaptation. 57 Thus, one of our responses to environmental 
migration should be to relax these restrictions not only to reduce 
global poverty but also to facilitate adaptation to environmental 
degradation in developing countries. 
55. See Jason Scott Johnston, A Looming Policy Disaster, Regulation, Fall 
2008, at 38, 44 (arguing in favor of immigration policies that allow "people in 
developing countries at particular risk from global warming . . .  [to] immigrate to 
the safer and more prosperous developed world"). 
56. Here I paraphrase Brown, who complains about the prevailing attitude of 
the international community: "[m]igration is typically seen as a failure of 
adaptation, not a form of it." Brown, supra note 1, at 38. 
57. See Masters, supra note 2, at 856 ("In the face of severe environmental 
stress, migration is a natural, adaptive, and inevitable occurrence. "). 
